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Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill: Second
Circuit Refuses to Extend Absolute
Immunity to Municipal Defendant
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that municipalities sued under The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, were not entitled to absolute immunity from suit.$ Kenneth
Goldberg brought suit against the town of Rocky Hill, Connecticut ("the
town"), its mayor, town manager, and councilmen in their official capacities, claiming he was wrongfully discharged. The town moved to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) claiming absolute immunity from suit. The district court denied the motion holding that the town
was not entitled to absolute immunity.' The town then brought an interlocutory appeal before the Second Circuit.5 The town's interlocutory appeal and the split among the circuits on this issue are the focus of this
Casenote.
II. FACTUAL STATEMENT
Goldberg commanded Rocky Hill's part-time supernumerary police officers. On April 7, 1987 a police lieutenant canceled the dispatch of a police cruiser to investigate two "suspicious looking" individuals described
as "Puerto Ricans."' Later, a citizen filed a complaint when his car was
stolen from the area in which the individuals were sighted. At a town
1. 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1992).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1992).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
3. 973 F.2d at 75.
4. Id. at 71.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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council meeting, the chief of police refused to discipline the lieutenant for
recalling the cruiser. Goldberg publicly supported the chief and stated
that the mayor and town council were wrong to criticize the police chief."
After the meeting, Goldberg began receiving official "slights." For example, the town stripped him of his title as commander, which he had
held for two and a half years, and excluded him from plainclothes detail.
The town also limited the amount of hours supernumerary officers could
work, and, finally eliminated them from the budget altogether. Although
other supernumerary officers were rehired as "Special Constables,"
Goldberg was not offered a position." Goldberg brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his discharge resulted from a valid exercise of his
First Amendment rights. The district court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
did not provide the city immunity from suit. The town appealed.
III.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S OPINION

On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that
the town was not entitled to absolute immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.1 The court began the analysis by stating that "[D]iscussion of
this immunity issue begins with, and indeed very nearly ends with, an
examination of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services."1 0 In Monell the Court held that a municipality can be held liable for constitutional violations only when the violation is a result of the municipality's "policy or custom."' , The court also
cited the more recent case of Owen v. City of Independence," in which
the Supreme Court rejected a municipality's argument that it was entitled to qualified, good-faith immunity from suit.1s
As a preliminary matter, the court stated that the parties agreed that
the town's elimination of the supernumerary officers qualified as the kind
of "policy" required by the Court in Monell. 1 4 With this established, the

town first argued that since the action was also brought against towncouncil members and the mayor in their official capacities, the town
should receive the council members' absolute immunity.1 5 The court re7. Id.
8, Id.
9. Id. at 75.
10. Id. at 72 (citing 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
11. Id. (quoting Monelt, 436 U.S. at 694).
12. 445 U.S. 622 (1979).
13, 973 F.2d at 74.
14. Id. at 72.
15. Id. at 73. Legislative and municipal immunity are separate issues. The Supreme
Court has not yet extended absolute legislative immunity to local legislators, but the Second
Circuit is one of at least nine circuits to extend the immunity to local legislators. Id. at 72.
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jected this argument citing Monell for the rule that official capacity suits
are simply another way of pleading a case against, the entity.10 To establish personal liability under section 1983, plaintiffs establish a prima facie
case by showing deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under
color of law." However, in an official-capacity action, the statute also requires that the unconstitutional conduct be a result of the entity's "policy
or custom."' Thus, the municipality has no immunity from suit, but the
plaintiff has the added burden of proving the wrong was a result of municipal policy.
The town's second argument sought "to avoid this clear inference from
Monell and Owen by arguing that while a municipality may not have any
immunities available to it in other contexts, liability stemming from municipal legislation should be treated differently.' 9 The court noted that
the town's argument relied on Connecticut state law which prevents legislators from testifying about the motives behind their legislation.2 The
court rejected this state law argument noting that the supremacy clause
requires the court to use the applicable federal law to determine liability
under section 1983." The court concluded that federal constitutional litigation permits the examination of a legislator's motives, leaving defendant with no way to distinguish municipal legislation.2

IV.. ANALYSIS
In Goldberg the Second Circuit Court of Appeals faced an issue that
should be of little controversy: whether municipalities are entitled to absolute immunity from suit when the cause of action alleges a violation of
constitutional rights.2 2 The court logically extended Supreme Court precedent to provide no immunity for municipal defendants. The Supreme
Court, in dicta, supports this conclusion as settled law.2 4 However, despite
the clear inference from the prior Supreme Court cases, two other circuits
25
have not treated the issue as settled.

16. Id. at 73 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 658, 690 n.55).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 74.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 70.
24. Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 1993 WL 52174 (US.) (1993). See infra text accompanying notes 42-45.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 46-59.
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Supreme Court precedents on municipal immunity clearly support the
court's ruling.26 In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 7 the Court
overruled Monroe v. Pape2 8 insofar as it held that local governments were
entirely immune from section 1983 suits.2 The Court in Monell concluded that for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipalities are "persons" and as such are subject to suit;30 however, to make out a prima
facie case, plaintiff must prove that the constitutional violation came
31
from the municipality's "policy or custom.
The Court in City of Los Angeles v. Heller3 2 held that municipal liability is derivative of the individual legislator's liability.33 Thus, even though
the legislator is personally immune from suit for unconstitutional legislative conduct because of the doctrine of legislative immunity,3 4 the municipality can be liable for the legislator's conduct. A classic example of the
necessary "policy or custom" includes "voting by elected officials, prepared reports, extended deliberation, or official records .. .
The Supreme Court's decision in Owen presents the strongest arguments for the Second Circuit's opinion. The Court in Owen rejected a
municipality's argument that it was entitled to good faith qualified immunity from suit when it fired the chief of police without stating reasons for
dismissal or holding a hearing on the issue.3 1 The Court's primary reason
for rejecting municipal immunity stems from a fundamental purpose of
the Civil Rights Act (the "Act"): to protect individuals from the misuse of
official power.37 Because legislators are already immune from suit, plaintiffs who have suffered constitutional violations by a state actor would be
left without a defendant if the municipality was granted immunity also.
The Act would have no effect, and society would suffer:
How "uniquely amiss" it would be, therefore, if the government itself-"the social organ to which all in our society look for the promotion
of liberty, justice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy
26. In Owen Justice Brennan interpreted his (the majority) opinion in Monell to hold
that municipalities are not entitled to absolute immunity. 445 U.S. at 624. Since the issue
was not clearly before the Court, it cannot be considered the Court's holding.
27. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
28. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

29. 436 U.S. at 663.
30. Id. at 690.
31. Id. at 694.
32. 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
33. Id.
34. See supra note 15.
35. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S, 469, 500 (198&) (Powell, J., dissenting) citing 436
U.S. at 694.
36. 445 U.S. at 629, 638.
37. 1d. at 650.
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norms and goals for social conduct"-were permitted to disavow liability
for the injury it has begotten."

There would also be no deterrent to future constitutional violations, 8 9 and
granting municipal defendants absolute immunity would undermine prior
Supreme Court cases.
Using statutory construction to support this conclusion, the Court has
interpreted the Act to include only the immunities available at common
law at the time the Act was passed. 40 The Court in Owen specifically
stated that "there is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations
... . Y41 Further support for the Second Circuit is found in the recent
2 In Leatherman the Court, in
case of Leatherman v. Tarrant County.1
dicta, stated that municipalities do not enjoy either qualified or absolute
immunity.4 3 The opinion concerned pleading requirements for civil rights
cases that alleged municipal liability."" The Court traced the development
of municipal liability and concluded from Owen that although municipalities are not entitled to any form of immunity, the wrong must be the
result of municipal policy for there to be municipal liability."8
Even though the result in Goldberg clearly follows established precedent, Hollyday v. Rainey,4" (a 1992 Fourth Circuit case) proves that the
issue is still debatable. Writing for the three judge panel Judge Hall
stated that a municipality is absolutely immune from suit when the cause
of action turns upon the improper motives of legislators.4 However, it is
unclear whether this was the court's holding, since in the concurrence
Judge Luttig only agreed with the judgment.4 8
The court in Hotlyday relied only on Fourth Circuit cases concerning
legislative immunity making no reference to Monell or Owen.40 Apparently, the Fourth Circuit would agree with the town's argument that since
a legislator cannot be compelled to testify about the motives behind his
vote, the municipality should also receive immunity in order to prevent
the legislator from having to testify.50 "Legislators must be permitted to
discharge their legislative duties without fear of being subjected to the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 651 (citing Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970)).
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id.
No. 91-1657, 1993 WL 52174 (1993).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1443.
Id. at 1444.
Id. at 1443.
973 F.2d at 74.
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cost and inconvenience of a trial at which their motives come under
scrutiny.''51

Both the concurrence and dissent used the same Supreme Court cases.
However, each reached different conclusions. 2 The concurrence decided
the case on the basis that plaintiff did not establish Monel's requisite
policy element for the prima facie case.53 The dissent held that plaintiff
established a prima facie case of constitutional tort and that the municipality was not entitled to any immunity from suit."'
In Brown v. Crawford County, Georgia," the Eleventh Circuit also suggested the possibility of absolute municipal immunity." In Brown local
legislators appealed the trial court's denial of their claim to absolute legislative immunity for their legislative acts.5 7 The Eleventh Circuit recognized their absolute legislative immunity, and, in footnote seventeen, sua
sponte dismissed the case against the municipal defendant." The court
quoted an ambiguous proposition from Spallone v. United States": "The
city, for all practical purposes, therefore, acts through the city council
when it comes to the enactment of legislation."6 0 This quotation can be
read in one of two ways. First, the court is granting the municipality absolute immunity. Second, since there is no ripe claim against the city,
there is no ripe claim against the municipality. The text of the opinion
concerned immunity, but footnote seventeen redirects the reader back to
footnote three, which concerned several issues, one of which is ripeness.
V. CONCLUSION

By logical extension of Supreme Court precedent, the Second Circuit in
Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill refused to extend absolute immunity to a
municipal defendant in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both
public policy reasons and prior interpretation of the Civil Rights Act support the court's conclusion. In addition, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County sends a strong signal that the split
51.
52.
53.
54.

964 F.2d at 1443.
Id. at 1445, 1448-49.
Id. at 1445-46.
Id. at 1448.

55. 960 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1992).
56. Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1012 n.17.
493 U.S. 265, 269 (1990).
960 F.2d at 1012 n.17 (quoting 493 U.S. at 269).
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among the circuits will be settled by refusing municipalities any immunity whatsoever.
NANCY

J.
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